1. Introduction. Let i4=||a(*\ j)\\ be an rXs matrix with real entries. Consider the game in which nature picks a column, j, the experimeter a row, i, and the experimenter is paid a sum a(i, j) (possibly negative). The game is to be repeated countably many times, with the restriction that nature must select a sequence with averages. That is, for each j, j = 1, • • • , s, the frequency with which the column j is chosen in the first n plays, <?y(w), converges, as n-•»<*>, to some q$.
Hannan [2] has exhibited a mixed strategy for the experimenter such that, for every sequence of nature with frequencies q$, the average expected payoff will converge to M = max» XX i a (iiJ)Qs* Blackwell [l] has exhibited a strategy such that, for every sequence of nature with frequencies q 3 ; lim^oo (1/iV) XiiLi P n = M with probability one, where P n denotes the payoff at time n under the chosen mixed strategy.
We here exhibit a class of pure strategies under which the averages (1/iV) X^-i Pn converge to M for every allowable sequence of nature.
(By a pure strategy we mean a function ƒ( {x n } ) = {y n } where {x n } is a sequence of elements of {l, • • • , s} and {y n } is a sequence of elements of {l, • • • , r} with y n constant on {#!.,••• ,x n -i} cylinders. In brief, the experimenter's choice at time n is a function of nature's choices at times 1,2, • • • , » -1.) Our result insures that, without the necessity of mixed strategies by the experimenter, but with a suitably chosen pure strategy, his average payoff will converge to the minimax payoff if nature chooses a minimax mixed strategy and, moreover, will take full advantage of any weaker strategy on nature's part.
2. Example. Let nature select a sequence of zeros and ones with a density, d, of ones. The experimenter, after trial n, having observed the past, guesses nature's choice at time n + 1 and is awarded 1 or 0 units according as he is right or wrong; i.e., the payoff matrix is 
We omit the proofs of the lemmas. PROOF OF THE THEOREM. The proof is divided into two parts. 
